Abstract. Symbolic secrecy of exchanged keys is arguably one of the most important notions of secrecy shown with automated proof tools. It means that an adversary restricted to symbolic operations on terms can never get the entire key into its knowledge set. Cryptographic key secrecy essentially means computational indistinguishability between the real key and a random one, given the view of a much more general adversary. We analyze the cryptographic key secrecy for the strengthened Yahalom protocol, which constitutes one of the most prominent key exchange protocols analyzed symbolically by means of automated proof tools. We show that the strengthened Yahalom protocol does not guarantee cryptographic key secrecy. We further show that cryptographic key secrecy can be proven for a slight simplification of the protocol by exploiting recent results on linking symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy in order to perform a symbolic proof of secrecy for the simplified Yahalom protocol in a specific setting that allows us to derive the desired cryptographic key secrecy from the symbolic proof. The proof holds in the presence of arbitrary active attacks provided that the protocol is relying on standard provably secure cryptographic primitives.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols for key establishment are an established technology. Nevertheless, most new networking and messaging stacks come with new protocols for such tasks. Since designing cryptographic protocols is known to be error-prone and, owing to the distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved protocol runs, security proofs of such protocols are awkward to make for humans, automation of such proofs has been studied almost since cryptographic protocols first emerged. From the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models after the first authors [17] , e.g., see [24, 1, 29, 31] . These models replace cryptography by term algebras, e.g., encrypting a message m twice does not yield a different message from the basic message space but the term E(E(m)). A typical cancellation rule is D(E(m)) = m for all m. It is assumed that even an adversary can only operate on terms by the given operators and by exploiting the given cancellation rules. This assumption, in other words the use of initial models of the given equational specifications, makes it highly nontrivial to know if results obtained over a Dolev-Yao model are also proved in [5, 4] . The former is entirely an authentication proof and hence does not have to reason about secrecy aspects. The latter contains a key secrecy property but this was reformulated by hand into a (considerably weaker) integrity property so that the integrity preservation theorem could be used.
Laud [26] has presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric encryption under active attacks. His work is directly connected with a formal proof tool, but it is specific to certain confidentiality properties and protocol classes. Herzog et al. [21] and Micciancio and Warinschi [30] have also given a cryptographic underpinning under active attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [9] since they are specific for public-key encryption and certain protocol classes, but consider slightly simpler real implementations. Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations, in particular [27, 22] and, as a second step, to encode them into proof tools. This approach can not yet handle protocols with any degree of automation.
Cortier and Warinschi [16] have shown that symbolically secret nonces are also computationally secret, i.e., indistinguishable from a fresh random value given the view of a cryptographic adversary. Backes and Pfitzmann [8] and Canetti and Herzog [15] have established new symbolic criteria for proving a key cryptographically secret.
The Strengthened Yahalom Protocol
The Yahalom protocol [14] and its strengthened variant [32] are four-step protocols for establishing a shared secret encryption key between two users. The protocol relies on a distinguished trusted party T, and it is assumed that every user u initially shares a secret key K ut with T. Expressed in the typical protocol notation as in, e.g., [28] , the strengthened Yahalom works as follows.
User u seeks to share a new session key with user v. It generates a nonce N u and sends it to v together with its identity (first message). Next, v generates a new nonce N v , creates a new message containing the identity u and the nonce N u , and encrypts it with the key it shares with T. Then v sends its identity, its nonce N v , and the encryption to the trusted party (second message). Now T decrypts the encryption yielding the identity of u and the nonce N u , generates a fresh key K uv for u and v, generates a message according to the protocol description, and sends it to u (third message). Then u decrypts the first encryption and tests whether the contained nonce is the one it sent to v before, i.e., to the identity that is contained in this encryption. If so, it forwards the second encryption to v (fourth message) together with an encryption of N v with the shared key K uv and terminates the protocol by outputting a handle to the shared secret key K uv to its user. Finally v decrypts the first encryption contained in this message, obtains the shared key K uv , and tests if the message contains its own identity and the contained nonce was previously sent to T. If so, it further decrypts the second encryption and checks if the obtained nonce matches N v . It then outputs a handle to the shared key K uv to its user and terminates the protocol. Note that the fourth message of the strengthened Yahalom protocol contains an encryption of the nonce N v with the shared key K uv . We show below that this encryption destroys cryptographic key secrecy. We subsequently analyze the protocol obtained by removing this encryption, and we show cryptographic key secrecy for this protocol. We only briefly note that the authenticity guarantees of the Yahalom protocol [32] still hold in our setting if we omit this encryption from the fourth message, since our cryptographic implementation is already based on an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme; authenticated encryption is necessary for exploiting the underlying proof of cryptographic soundness of the Dolev-Yao model.
Why the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol does not offer Cryptographic Key Secrecy
We now briefly sketch why the unmodified strengthened Yahalom protocol cannot achieve cryptographic key secrecy. The argument is general (and obvious for a cryptographer) and applies to all key exchange protocols that already use the exchanged key to compute an encryption that becomes known to the adversary. The reason is that symmetric encryptions provide partial information about a symmetric secret key, at least if one also has partial information about the message encrypted. This partial information already allows an adversary to distinguish the exchanged key from a random key that has been chosen independently of the protocol. To distinguish the keys, the adversary first completes a regular execution of the protocol between two honest parties, thus learning the nonce N v and the encryption (N v ) Kuv . A bit b is then flipped, and the adversary receives a key K, which equals the (unknown) key K uv if b = 0 or a fresh random key if b = 1. The adversary then decrypts (N v ) Kuv with K yielding N and outputs b * := 0 as its guess on b if N = N v , and b * := 1 otherwise. The probability of a correct guess is then given by 1 − ǫ, where ǫ denotes the probability that for a randomly chosen nonce N v and randomly chosen keys K uv , K, we have that (N v ) Kuv decrypted with K yields N v again, which is negligible. The adversary has thus a non-negligible advantage of distinguishing the keys. Hence cryptographic key secrecy does not hold.
Protocol Details with the Dolev-Yao-style Cryptographic Library
We now capture the simplified version of the strengthened Yahalom protocol, i.e., without the encryption (N v ) Kuv in its fourth step, using the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [9] . For simplicity, we speak of the Yahalom protocol again in the following. Almost all formal proof techniques for protocols first need a reformulation of the protocol into a more detailed version than the four steps above. These details include necessary tests on received messages, the types and generation rules for values like u and N u , and a surrounding framework specifying the number of participants, the possibilities of multiple protocol runs, and the adversary capabilities. We now present the protocol details when using the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [9] as well as general aspects of this framework.
Algorithm 1 Evaluation of User Inputs in
We write ":=" for deterministic assignment, and ↓ is an error element available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The framework is automata-based, i.e., protocols are executed by interacting machines, and event-based, i.e., machines react on received inputs. By M Ya i we denote the Yahalom machine for a participant i; it can act in the roles of both u and v above.
The first type of input that M Ya i
can receive is a start message (new prot, Yahalom, v) from its user denoting that it should start a protocol run with user v. The number of users is called n.
1 User inputs are distinguished from network inputs by arriving at a so-called port KE in u ?. The "?" for input ports follows the CSP convention, and "KE" stands for key exchange because the user interface is the same for all key exchange protocols. The reaction on this input, i.e., the sending of the first message, is described in Algorithm 1. The command gen nonce generates the nonce. M Ya u stores the resulting so-called handle n hnd u (a local name that this machine has for the corresponding term) in a set Nonce u for future comparison together with the identity v and an indicator that this nonce was generated and stored by u in the first step. The set Nonce u formally consists of triples (n hnd , w, j) where n hnd is a handle, w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A triple (n hnd , w, j) means that M Ya u stored the handle n hnd in the j-th protocol step in a session with w. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into the cryptographic library, here the user identity u. The command list forms a list, and the final command send i means that M Ya u sends the resulting term to v over an insecure channel. The effect is that the adversary obtains a handle to the term and can decide what to do with it (such as forwarding it to M Ya v or performing Dolev-Yao-style algebraic operations on the term). The superscript hnd on most parameters denotes that these are handles, i.e., the users obtain local names for the corresponding terms. This is an important aspect of [9] because it allows the same protocol description to be implemented once with Dolev-Yao-style idealized cryptography and once with real cryptography. The four commands we saw so far and their input and output domains belong to the interface (in the same sense as, e.g., a Java interface) of the underlying cryptographic library. This interface is implemented by both the idealized and the real version. In the first case, the handles are local names of Dolev-Yao-style terms, in the second case of real cryptographic bitstrings, on which the adversary can perform arbitrary bit manipulations. We say more about these two implementations below. ). {c
Algorithm 2 Behavior of the Trusted Party
The treatment of network inputs by protocol machines and by the trusted third party is defined similar to Algorithm 1. Network inputs of user u arrive at port out u ? and are of the form (v, u, i, m hnd ) where v is the supposed sender, i denotes that the channel is insecure, and m hnd is a handle to a list. The port out u ? is connected to the cryptographic library, whose two implementations represent the obtained Dolev-Yao-style term or real bitstring, respectively, to the protocol in a unified way by the handle m hnd . Due to space constraints, we omit an informal description of how these inputs are processed; this should already be clear from the preceding protocol description. Moreover, we only give the algorithmic description how the trusted third party reacts on network inputs in Algorithm 2 and postpone the algorithmic description how the protocol machines react on network inputs to [7] .
We furthermore use the convention that every machine should immediately abort the handling of the current input if a cryptographic command does not yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption fails.
Overall Framework and Adversary Model
The framework that determines how machines such as our Yahalom machines and the machines of the idealized or real cryptographic library execute is taken from [33] . The basis is an asynchronous probabilistic execution model with distributed scheduling and with a well-defined Turing-machine refinement for complexity considerations. We already used implicitly above that for term construction and parsing commands to the cryptographic library, so-called local scheduling is defined, i.e., a result is returned immediately. The idealized or real network sending via this library, however, is scheduled by the adversary.
When protocol machines such as M Ya u are defined there is no guarantee that all these machines are correct. A trust model determines for what subsets H of {1, . . . , n, T} we want to guarantee anything; here these are the subsets that contain at least the trusted party: We prove secrecy of keys shared by u and v whenever u, v ∈ H and thus whenever M Ya u and M Ya v are correct. Incorrect machines disappear and are replaced by the adversary. Each set of potential correct machines together with its user interface is called a structure, and the set of these structures is called the system. When considering the security of a structure, an arbitrary probabilistic machine H is connected to the user interface to represent all users, and an arbitrary probabilistic machine A is connected to the remaining free ports (typically the network) and to H to represent the adversary. In polynomial-time security proofs, H and A are polynomial-time. This setting implies that any number of concurrent protocol runs with the honest participants and the adversary are considered because H and A can arbitrarily interleave protocol start inputs (new prot, Yahalom, v) with the delivery of network messages.
For a set H of honest participants, the user interface of the Yahalom protocol machines is S KE H := {KE in u ?, KE out u ! | u ∈ H \ {T}}. The ideal and real Yahalom protocol serving this interface differ only in the cryptographic library, i.e., the Yahalom machines either rely on a setM 
The Key Secrecy Property
In the following, we formalize the key secrecy property of the ideal and real Yahalom protocols. The property is an instantiation of a general symbolic key secrecy definition for arbitrary protocols based on the ideal cryptographic library from [8] , which is based on the typical notion that a term is not an element of the adversary's knowledge set. In the given Dolev-Yao-style library, the adversary's knowledge set is the set of all terms to which the adversary has a handle.
Overview and States of the Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms and allows each user to operate on them via handles, i.e., via local names specific to this user. The handles also contain the information that knowledge sets give in other Dolev-Yao formalizations: The set of terms that a participant u knows, including u = a for the adversary, is the set of terms with a handle for u. The terms are typed; for instance, decryption only succeeds on ciphertexts and projection only on lists. Moreover, the terms are globally numbered by a so-called index. Each term is represented by its type (i.e., root node) and its first-level arguments, which can be indices of earlier terms. This enables easy distinction of, e.g., which of many nonces is encrypted in a larger term. These global indices are never visible at the user interface. The indices and the handles for each participant are generated by one counter each.
The data structure storing the terms in [9] is a database D. Generally, a database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose attributes fulfill pred . If D [pred ] contains only one element, we use the same notation for this element. Adding an entry x to D is abbreviated D :⇐ x. Moreover, we write the list operation as l := (x 1 , . . . , x j ), and argument retrieval as
In the specific term database D, each entry x can have the following arguments (with domains omitted for brevity): x.ind is the global index of an entry, which is used as a primary key attribute of the database, i.e., we write
x.type denotes the type of x and x.arg = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j ) is a possibly empty list of arguments. x.hnd u for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles, where x.hnd u = ↓ means that u does not know this entry. Finally, x.len denotes the length of the entry. The machine TH H has a counter size ∈ IN DS for the current size of D and counters curhnd u (current handle) for the handles, all initialized with 0.
In order to capture that keys shared between users and the trusted party have already been generated and distributed, we assume that suitable entries for the keys already exist in the database. We denote the handle of u to the secret key shared with v, where either u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v = T or vice versa, by skse hnd u,v .
The Real Cryptographic Library
In the real cryptographic library, each user has its own machine. This machine contains a database D u with only three main attributes: the handle hnd u for this user u, the real cryptographic bitstring word , and the type type. The users can use the same commands as with the ideal library, e.g., en-or decrypt a message etc. These commands now trigger real cryptographic operations. The operations use standard cryptographically secure primitives, but with certain additional tagging, randomization etc. Send commands now trigger the actual sending of bitstrings between machines and/or to the adversary.
Definition of the Key Secrecy Property
The first step towards defining symbolic key secrecy is to consider one state of the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library and to define that a handle points to a symmetric key, that the key is symbolically unknown to the adversary, and that it has not been used for encryption or authentication. These are the symbolic conditions under which we can hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistinguishable from a fresh random key for the adversary. Note that the operations that the Yahalom protocol performs on new keys are allowed in this sense. For Condition (3) in the definition, note that the arguments of a ciphertext term are (l, pk ) where l is the plaintext index and pk the index of the public tag of the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the secret key index. [8] ) Let {T} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n, T}, a database state D of TH cry H , and a pair (u, l hnd ) ∈ H × HN DS of a user and a handle be given. Let i := D[hnd u = l hnd ].ind be the corresponding database index. The term under (u, l hnd ) (1) is a symmetric encryption key iff
Definition 1. (Symbolically Secret Encryption Keys

